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ABSTRACT
The American University in Cairo
Department of Law
Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Which Approach Is Closer to Arbitration?
Student: Ahmed Galal Zaki
Advisor: Amr Shalakany
Adversarial techniques such as pre-trial discovery of documents, crossexamination, and lengthy oral pleadings are now in vogue in the conduct of
international commercial arbitration proceedings. This paper responds to this
trend by analyzing both the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems in an
attempt to demonstrate which is more fulfilling to the objectives of
international commercial arbitration. These objectives are party autonomy,
neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and confidentiality. In the finale, the paper
provides that although the adversarial system is in line with the autonomy
rights of those who opt for arbitration, its inquisitorial counterpart is more
neutral, efficient, flexible, and confidential. It argues, furthermore, that since
arbitration is in essence a mechanism that comes at the expense of parties'
rights in favor of the efficiency and the flexibility of the arbitral process, the
inquisitorial system is more proximate to the objectives of international
arbitration and, therefore, more realizing to the aspirations of its customers.
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ADVERSARIAL OR INQUISITORIAL:
WHICH APPROACH IS CLOSER TO ARBITRATION?

Chapter I: Introduction

International commercial arbitration is a mechanism to resolve commercial disputes
between international parties. It has grown to substitute for the inefficiencies of national
litigation. People perceive arbitration as a way to resolve their disputes in an efficient,
flexible, and speedy fashion. Indeed, the attainment of these goals depends heavily on the
way arbitration is conducted, i.e., the proceedings that govern the arbitral process from its
commencement to the issuance of an award. Some parties prefer the inquisitorial system
with its active role of the arbitrator, while others seek to maintain control over the process
by utilizing adversarial techniques, such as cross-examination and discovery of
documents. We can also find parties utilizing an amalgam of both systems. Nonetheless,
there is a tendency in today's international arbitration to adopt the adversarial system with
its distinctive tools. This can be attributed to the influence of the American legal culture
on international arbitration in general.
In response to this phenomenon, I will analyze in this paper the adversarial system by
contrasting it with the inquisitorial system to see which is more compatible with the
features of international commercial arbitration. In my view, the inquisitorial system, due
to its efficiency, flexibility, neutrality, and confidentiality, is better than its adversarial
kin. Although the latter upholds the autonomy rights of the parties, its very techniques
conflict with the goals of international arbitration. Plus, maintaining rights is not the
motto of international arbitration. Having decided to resort to arbitration, parties

1

relinquish many of the rights that are guaranteed in ordinary court litigation. They prefer
arbitration to avail themselves primarily of its efficiency and flexibility.
In this academic endeavor, I will invoke the arbitration rules of two major
international arbitral institutions, namely, the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris and the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration. My aim is
to discover their procedural nature, whether they are inquisitorial or adversarial. I will
also explore the opinions of some prominent Egyptian international arbitrators about their
systemic preferences when they administer the arbitral process.
In fact, this topic is a novelty to international arbitration academic studies. Although
some commentators get to some extent closer to it, none of them exclusively addresses
the suitability of the adversarial and the inquisitorial techniques with international
arbitration. That stems in part from the fact that some of them consider the analysis of
arbitration procedures in terms of their adversarial or inquisitorial nature overly
simplistic. 1 It can also be attributed to the belief espoused by others that the practice of
international arbitration has smashed all cultural barriers and adopted a set of harmonized
techniques that represent the best in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems. 2
Nonetheless, I contend that cultural differences still play a significant role in the conduct
of arbitration proceedings to the extent of frustrating the expectations of parties to
arbitration from different legal cultures. Thus, it is important to analyze both the
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems in order to determine which is worthy of being
adopted in international arbitration proceedings as it better fits with the arbitral culture.

1

See, e.g., Kathleen Paisley, Report: Commencement of the Arbitration and Conduct of the Arbitration,
9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 107, 107 (1998).
2

See e.g., Paul D. Friedland, Combining Civil Law and Common Law Elements in the Presentation of
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, 12(9) INT'L ARB. REP. 25 (1997).

2

Chapter II of this paper presents a portrait of international commercial arbitration, its
definition, features, and nature. Chapter III relates to the adversarial and the inquisitorial
systems in terms of their philosophy and technique. Chapter IV analyzes the arbitration
rules of both the Paris based International Chamber of Commerce and the Cairo Regional
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration from an adversarial/inquisitorial
perspective. Chapter V presents the opinions of some international arbitrators about the
question of this paper. Chapter VI answers this question. Chapter VII serves as a
conclusion.

3

Chapter II: International Commercial Arbitration

In this part, I will present a portrait of international commercial arbitration that
demonstrates its definition, features, and nature. My aim here is to single arbitration out
as a means of settling international commercial disputes in order to determine later in this
paper what set of procedures is most compatible with it. By design, I will emphasize the
features that are most conducive to aim. Thus, there are some other attributes of
international arbitration, and they are significant, that are absent from my analysis. 3

A. What is International Commercial Arbitration?
1. Arbitration Defined.

It is actually difficult to propose a definition of arbitration that encompasses all attempts
made in this regard by national laws and arbitral institutions. However, I will give some
general definitions that serve as a starting point for analyzing arbitration and illuminating
its distinctive features.

Around seventy years ago, one American court provided that:
[b]roadly speaking, arbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any
controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition
of the matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit their
controversy to such judges for determination, in place of the tribunal provided by the
ordinary processes of law.4
3

For example, separability of the arbitration agreement and the competence of the arbitral tribunal to
determine whether it has jurisdiction to look into the dispute (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) are important
features of international commercial arbitration, but I do not address them due to their irrelevance to
the topic of this paper. See generally ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 298-304 (4th ed. 2004) [Hereinafter REDFERN &
HUNTER].
4

Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration – What Is It? 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1960) (quoting Gates v.
Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1939)).

4

Further, one commentator defines arbitration as:
A device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two or more
persons is entrusted to one or more other persons – the arbitrator or arbitrators – who
derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a State, and
who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an agreement. 5

Another commentator perceives arbitration as:
A private mechanism for the resolution of disputes which takes place in private
pursuant to an agreement between two or more parties, under which the parties agree
to be bound by the decision to be given by the arbitrator according to law after a fair
hearing, such decision being enforceable as law.6

2. The Meaning of International and Commercial

The type of arbitration which I emphasize in this paper is that which involves different
nationalities, legal cultures, and procedural systems. It is the international rather than the
domestic form of arbitration. Also, I address arbitrations that relate to commercial
disputes with their special character.
In order to define the term "international", two main standards are used. The first one
is the nature of the dispute which assumes that an arbitration is international if it involves
the interests of international trade. 7 The second standard is that of the nationality of the
parties.8 According to that standard, an arbitral dispute is international provided the

5

RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as DAVID].

6

HENRY J. BROWN & ARTHUR L. MARRIOT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 56 (1993) [hereinafter
referred to as BROWN & MARRIOT].
7

REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 16.

8

Id. at 18.

5

parties are of different nationalities, place of residence, or place of business management
in case of corporations.9
On the other hand, it is important to know whether the legal relationship between the
arbitrating parties is commercial or not. Problems that pertain to the enforcement of
arbitral awards sometimes arise due to different interpretations and understandings of the
term "commercial" by different countries. 10 Generally speaking, commercial contracts are
those which are made by merchants or businesspersons with respect to the normal course
of their business. 11

Trying to produce a monolithic approach in this regard, the

UNCITRAL Model Law states the following:
The term commercial should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters
arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.
Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following
transactions: any trade transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange
of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency;
factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing;
investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession;
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of goods
or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.12

B. The Normative Features of International Arbitration

The above definitions highlight a number of attributes that are considered hallmarks of
international arbitration. They distinguish arbitration as a different means of settling
international commercial disputes vis a vis ordinary court litigation and other ADR
techniques. As far as the purpose of this paper goes, these attributes are: party autonomy,
neutrality, efficiency, procedural flexibility, and confidentiality. In addition, there is

9

Id.

10

Id. at 525.

11

Id. at 20.

12

Id. at 22 (quoting UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, footnote to art.
1(1)).
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another feature that is considered, by contrast to these attributes, a disadvantage of
international arbitration, namely, the limited powers of the arbitral tribunal.

1. Party Autonomy.

The principle of party autonomy is considered "one of the most fundamental
characteristics of international commercial arbitration"13 By virtue of this principle,
parties are endowed with a prior control over the arbitral process. 14 They can determine
the scope of their arbitration,15 i.e., the issues that are going to be arbitrated; they can also
select their arbitrators and choose the venue of arbitration. 16 In addition, parties are
entitled to determine the law applicable to the substance of their dispute 17 and, most
relevantly, the procedures by which arbitrators should abide. 18 It follows that the parties
may adopt an adversarial or inquisitorial approach to the arbitral proceedings, or even an
amalgam of both.
Nonetheless, the freedom of the parties to shape the procedural framework on which
the arbitration is conducted does not go unbridled. It is restricted by certain
considerations,19 salient among which are the following:

13

GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 44 (1994).
14

Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 411 (2002) [hereinafter Rogers].
15

See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 277-313.

16

See generally id. at 210-276.

17

See generally id. at 89-154.

18

See generally id. at 314-387.

19

There are other two considerations which are absent from this enumeration: arbitration rules and
third parties, REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 319.

7

1-Equality
The arbitral tribunal should treat the parties on equal footing even though they have
agreed otherwise.20 The UNCITRAL Model Law emphasizes this concept by stating that
"[t]he parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full
opportunity of presenting his case."21
2-Puplic Policy
The arbitral award may risk being unenforceable if the arbitration is conducted in a
manner that contradicts with the public policy of the state in which the enforcement is
sought.22

2. Neutrality

One advantage of international commercial arbitration is ability of the parties to avoid the
uncertainties of each other's legal system and in particular national litigation. 23 Parties
presume, for whatever reason, that they won't be afforded justice in their opponent's
land. 24 Thus, they can agree, thanks to their autonomy, upon a neutral forum, a neutral set
of arbitrators, and even neutral rules that govern both the merits of the dispute and the
proceedings of arbitration. In a survey on individuals participating in international
commercial arbitration, 72 percent identified "neutrality" and 64 percent identified
"enforceability" as "highly relevant to their decision to arbitrate."25 Moreover, In support

20

Id. at 317.

21

Model Law, United Nation Commission of International Trade Law, Art. 18.

22

See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 318.

23

See BROWN & MARRIOT, supra note 6, at 72.

24

Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial
Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 95 (2000) [hereinafter Drahozal].
25

Id. n. 83 (citing Christian Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business 395
(1996)).

8

of this advantage of arbitration, Charles N. Brower, a distinguished international
arbitrator made the following statement:
By and large, parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate eventual disputes
. . . because neither will suffer its rights and obligations to be determined by the
courts of the other party's state of nationality. International arbitration thus in large
measure a substitute for national court litigation. 26

3. Efficiency

It has been noted that efficiency is one of the normative goals of international
arbitration. 27

Indeed, arbitration ensures this feature in a multifold fashion. First,

arbitration is a cost-and-time-saving means for settling international commercial disputes.
While some believe that arbitration is not always more cost-effective than litigation, 28
arbitration is still a privilege if we take into account the costs of delay and appeals before
ordinary courts.29 It should be noted, moreover, that the parties in their agreement, to
guarantee a speedy determination of their disputes, may provide for a time-limit for the
tribunal to render the award.30 Some arbitral institutions provide also for this time-limit.
For instance, the ICC Rules of Arbitration oblige the tribunal to render the award within
six months from the date on which the terms of reference were signed by the tribunal or

26

Id. at 95 (quoting CHARLES N. BROWER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: TOWARDS JUDICIALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY? ix-x (RICHARD B. LILLICH & CHARLES N.
BROWER EDS., 1994)).
27

See Rogers, supra note 14, at 408-410.

28

See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 28. (stating that "fees and expenses of the arbitrators
(unlike the salary of the judge) must be paid by the parties; and in international commercial arbitrations
of any significance, these charges may be substantial.").
29

M.I.M. ABOUL-ENEIN, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 28 (2005) [hereinafter
ABOUL-ENEIN].
30

See DAVID, supra note 5, at 268-269 (noting that providing for a time-limit "may be regarded as
useful to hasten the arbitrators.").
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the parties or the date on which the tribunal was notified by the secretariat that the court
approved these terms.31
Secondly, the arbitral award is final

32

and it has a res judicata effect.33 This means

that the award, taking into account any procedures for challenging it,34 disposes finally of
the issues submitted to the arbitral tribunal and terminates the mandate conferred upon
it.35 In addition, parties are not allowed to submit to another forum, whether arbitral or
judicial, what has been decided by the arbitral tribunal. 36
Thirdly, the arbitral award is a binding determination of the legal rights of the
parties.

37

By this binding nature, arbitration is distinguished from other alternative

dispute resolution techniques. 38 In addition, businesspersons perceive arbitral awards as
binding because this is a promise made ab initio by them when they concluded the
arbitration agreement and they fear being criticized by and having a bad reputation within
their business community. 39 A corollary of this binding effect is the international
enforceability of the arbitral award. 40

Arbitral awards are easier to enforce

internationally than national court verdicts.41 That actually stems from the fact that

31

ICC Arbitration Rules, infra note 139, art. 24.1.

32

See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 442.

33

See generally id, at 459-461.

34

For those procedures, see generally id., at 479-509.

35

Id. at 417.

36

DAVID, supra note 5, at 356.

37

See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 44
(1982).
38

For a thorough knowledge of alternative dispute resolution techniques see generally REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 3, at 41-54.
39

DAVID, supra not 5, at 357.

40

See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 510-561.

41

See W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS
AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 1215 (1997) (stating that
"[a]rbitral awards as a whole enjoy a higher degree of transnational certainty than judgments of
national courts").
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several international conventions, salient among which is the New York Convention, 42
were concluded to ensure the enforceability of international arbitral awards throughout
the world.
That said, I wish to have managed to draw your attention to the fact that efficiency is
an important, if not the most, attribute of international commercial arbitration. It is
reflected in its expeditiousness, finality, and binding effect.

4. Procedural flexibility 43

Procedural flexibility is considered one of the advantages of arbitration over litigation. 44
Formal and complex procedural rules are incompatible with aims of international
commercial arbitration. 45 Complexity detracts from the efficient and speedy resolution of
the arbitral dispute. Due to this flexibility, parties are privileged to tailor-maid their
arbitration procedures to fit with the nature and circumstances of their dispute.46 They can
espouse the adversarial techniques of the presentation and taking of evidence or their
inquisitorial counterparts; also possible, they can adopt a mishmash of both systems. 47
They may refer, moreover, to certain institutional arbitration rules 48 or a specific national
arbitration law.
42

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517 (hereinafter New York Convention).
43

For a thorough understanding of the conduct of the proceedings in international arbitration, see
generally GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004)
[Hereinafter PETROCHILOS]; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 314-387.
44

See id. REDFERN & HUNTER, at 85.

45

See GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24 (1984).

46

REDFERN & HUNTER, at 85-86.

47

See Id., at 319-321. For a comparison of both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see
infra chapter III.
48

E.g., The International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, and the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration, an elaborate analysis of both institutions will be provided later,
see infra chapter IV.

11

Actually, since the parties rarely provide for procedural details in their agreement, the
determination of the shape and character of the arbitral procedures is vested in the arbitral
tribunal in the case of ad-hoc arbitration; and the arbitral institution in the case of
institutional arbitration. Accordingly, the nature of the procedures hinges heavily on the
professional background and experience of the arbitrators and the systemic predilections
of the arbitral institution.
This last point raises a very important and pertinent question; since the determination
of the procedures to be followed in the arbitral process rests, at the end of the day, in the
hands of the arbitral institutions and most precisely the arbitral tribunal, should it be
considered an infringement on fairness and a breach of neutrality if the arbitral tribunal
adopts the procedural religion, i.e., adversarial or inquisitorial, of one party rather than
the other? In other words, is the arbitral tribunal free to determine the systemic nature of
the proceedings as long as the parties' agreement is silent?
In an answer to this question, one commentator provides a list of procedural principles
that are believed to be widely applicable in international arbitration. One of those
principles states the following:

[t]he arbitral procedure should be neutral, conforming neither to the inquisitorial
nor the adversarial model, and should be adapted to the particular circumstances
of the case. In particular:
(a) oral pleadings should be strictly reasonable in length;
(b) full disclosure (as opposed to disclosure of documents on certain points only)
should be discouraged;
(c) the tribunal should retain full control over the proceedings; and
(d) the tribunal should not proceed to fix the particular rules of conduct of the
proceedings without consulting with the parties. 49

In my view, since the arbitral tribunal derives its mandate from the agreement of the
parties, it follows that as long as this agreement does not provide for a certain procedural
49

PETROCHILOS, supra note 43, at 219.

12

system, implicitly or explicitly, the tribunal is not being biased or unjust when it adopts
the system it sees fit for the conduct of the proceedings.
As a final point, this feature of arbitration is being constantly overridden as arbitration
becomes more formalized and judicialized. This is the subject of my discussion in the
next section.

5. Confidentiality

Another hallmark of international commercial arbitration is its exclusion of publicity. 50
This option is not available when parties to a dispute go to an ordinary court of law,
where press and public are present.51 In fact, commercial people resort to arbitration in
order to be able to keep their trade secrets, know-how, financial losses, and difficulties of
enterprises.52 A former Secretary-General of the ICC once stated that "[i]t became
apparent to me very soon after taking up my responsibilities at the ICC that the users of
international commercial arbitration, i.e. the companies, governments, and individuals
who are parties in such cases, place the highest value upon confidentiality as a
fundamental characteristic of international commercial arbitration." 53

50

DAVID, supra note 5, at 12.

51

REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 32.

52

DAVID, supra note 5, at 12.

53

Redfern & Hunter, supra note 3, at 32.

13

C. The Nature of International Arbitration

International arbitration was, roughly until twenty years ago, an informal method of
settling commercial disputes.54 The role of the arbitrator was merely to approximate the
positions of the parties, trying to reach a compromise based on principles of fairness
rather than express legal rules. 55 Today, this image is changing as arbitration is
metamorphosing into a judicial, formal, and adversarial process. 56 The following lines
will analyze this trend both in the U.S. and internationally, trying to identify its key
causes and repercussions.

1. The New Trend in the United States.

Edward Brunt describes the transformation of arbitration in the United Stated in a
noteworthy manner.57 He dubs the style upon which arbitration used to proceed as
folklore.58 Under this folklore model, arbitration was a speedy, cheap, private, final,
expert-based method of resolving disputes.59 The usual rules of evidence were not
observed; and there was no little or no discovery. 60 The rights of the parties were decided

54

Rogers, supra note 14, at 350.

55

See id at 351.

56

For an overview of the process of judicializing arbitration see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT
G. GARTH, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice out of the
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, in DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 33 (1996)
[hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH].
57

See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model Arbitration, 74
TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Brunet].
58

Id. at 42-45.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 45.

14

according to equitable principles rather than formal legal rules and there were no
reasoned awards.61
According to Brunet, the folklore model still exists but it has been commonly replaced
by a judicialized form of arbitration that is called, in Brunet's terminology, contract
model arbitration.62 The main characteristics of this new form are: document discovery,
deciding the dispute according to formal legal rules, written and reasoned awards, and
even appellate review.63 Brunet attributes this new trend to the competition in the
arbitration market between arbitration providers and a need on the part of disputants for a
judicialized model of arbitration.64
I believe that Brunet manages to contrast the extremes of the transformation process in
a way that portrays how arbitration has turned into a judicial method of settling disputes
in the U.S. Now, I turn to this transformation with respect to international arbitration.

2. The Judicialization of International Arbitration.

As I mentioned before, international arbitration began as an informal, equitable way of
settling disputes. Arbitrators were generally experts from the same trade with little or no
legal background.65 They relied in their decisions upon gentlemanly principles such as
amiable composition and ex aequo et bono. 66 Also, the use of the law of merchants or lex
61

See Id. at 42.

62

Id., at 45.

63

Id.

64

Id., at 41.

65

Rogers, supra note 14 at 351; see also DAVID, supra note 5, at 44-45.

66

See John Beechey, International Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change,
DISP. RESOL. J. 32 (2000) (describing the doctrine of amiable composition as "allowing arbitrators to
decide cases in accordance with customary principles of equity and international commerce. This
power permits arbitrators to arrive at an award that is fair in light of all circumstances, rather than strict
conformity with legal rules, [but] …generally [they] may not disregard mandatory provisions of
substantive law or public policy of the forum state").

15

mercatoria was in vogue.67 Indeed, in the old days, there was an emphasis on the just
rather than the legal determination of the arbitral dispute. Furthermore, procedurally
speaking, arbitrators had a strong grip over the arbitral process.68 They had the upper
hand in determining what document to present and which witness to call.
This modus operandi of international arbitration has recently become out-of-date. The
resolution of international dispute via arbitration is not at the moment so different from
litigation.69 Arbitrators are now ordinary lawyers or academics rather than persons
engaged in the same business as the parties to the dispute. 70 They rarely, if ever, invoke
amiable composition or lex mercatoria principles.71 Instead, parties refer in their
agreements to formal legal rules as they are more predictable and accountable. 72 At odds
with the normative principles of confidentiality and privacy, arbitral awards tend to be
reasoned and recurrently published.73 In a nutshell, arbitration has become a court-like
dispute resolution method.74
Most notably, this transformation has been carried out on an adversarial scale.
Arbitration procedural rules, being more textured but not entirely sophisticated, shifted to
a considerable extent the control over the arbitral process from the arbitrator to the

67

Rogers, supra note 14, at 351-352 (stating that"[t]he hallmark of lex mercatoria is its insistence on
the notion that a duty of good faith informs all contract interpretation and performance. In applying the
lex mercatoria's requirement of good faith, arbitrators could imply terms to achieve a more equitable
result . . .); see also David, supra note 5, 14.
68

Rogers at 351.

69

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56, at 54-57.

70

See Jacques Werner, The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration, J.
INT'L ARB. 5, 11 (1997).
71

See Drahozal, supra note 24, at 129. (stating that Stephen Bond's study of the arbitration agreement of
parties involved in the ICC arbitration in 1987 and 1989 found that only a handful selected "general
principles" of law to govern the parties' dispute and none specified the lex mercatoria to be the basis
for the arbitrator's decision. Only three percent of the clauses in 1987 and four per cent in 1989
authorized the arbitrators to decide in equity (ex aeqo et bono or as amiable compositeur)).
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See Rogers, supra note 14, at 345.
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Id. at 353.
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See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56, at 57-58.

16

parties. 75 This manifests itself in the newly-invented parties' power to request disclosure
of documents, decide which witnesses to present, and interview and cross-examine
them.76
In an article written almost three years ago, Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein77, Director of
the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 78, admits that:

[T]he last few years witnessed the birth of another new trends toward the application
of some pure adversarial procedural patterns in cases where there is no participation
of arbitrators, parties or counsel from any of the common law countries. A notable
number of the cases administered by the Cairo Centre in the last decade involve
parties from civil law countries, i.e., Egyptians, French, Italians, Kuwaiti, Saudi,
Romanian and others. It is noteworthy that the procedures in some of these cases
were oriented towards oral hearings, although the arbitrators and lawyers involved
were all from civil law countries. Pre-trial Discovery and cross-examination of
witnesses were widely practiced. All details of the cases were pleaded at the oral
hearings the same way as in the adversarial common law system. 79

3. The Influence of the American Legal Culture on International Arbitration.

The transformation of the arbitral process into a judicial one derives from a variety of
reasons,80 salient among which is the growing influence of the American legal culture
and in particular the Anglo-American law firm on international arbitration. 81 As
arbitration has approached court litigation in the United States, this trend radiates towards
the operation of arbitration throughout the world. Due to the fact that international
75

See Rogers, supra note 14, at 353.

76

Id. at 412-414.
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For information about Dr. Aboul-Enein, see infra note 211.
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For information about the arbitration system of the centre, see infra note 129.

79

M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, Multicultural Arbitrations: New Procedural Trends in Arab Countries, IFCA
Newsletter, June 2003.
80

For these reasons, see generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 63.

81

See Id. at 48-52; see generally Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69 (2003).
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arbitration is considered by American attorneys as a kind of "offshore litigation", 82 it is
no wonder then to find some techniques that were once deemed anathema to international
arbitration, such as document discovery, cross-examination, and depositions, sought after
by parties and adopted by arbitrators.
With that in mind, important questions come increasingly to the fore. Does this
judicialization, or a fortiori adversarialization, phenomenon comport with the ethos of
international commercial arbitration? Or it rather bears, as one commentator put, its
"decline"?83 Is the adversarial system capable of achieving the hopes of those who resort
to arbitration? Or should we download inquisitorial software to arbitration proceedings?
Which one of the two procedural systems is better? Which one is closer to arbitration?
Before embarking on an answer, let's first know what each system has in store; and also
which one is preferred by international arbitral institutions and international arbitrators.

82

REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3 (3d ed. 1999), at 283.

83

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56, at 57.
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Chapter III: The Adversarial and the Inquisitorial Systems

Procedural systems are mainly divided into two: the adversarial and the inquisitorial,
each belonging to the common law and the civil law families respectively. 84 Although
they sometimes overlap, each system has some features that distinguish it from the other.
Further, each is associated with, or at least inspired by, a set of social and political beliefs
that are thought to underlie its modus operandi. In this chapter, I will analyze both
systems with respect to their philosophy and technique, recognizing conspicuous features
that differentiate between them.

A. Philosophy.

It is difficult to grasp adversarial and inquisitorial techniques outside the cultural contexts
in which they function. The two systems are direct manifestations of certain cultural and
political attitudes. To be sure, every system is considered appropriate by its proponents,
not only because it is efficient or just, but also because it serves some firmly entrenched
values and convections.85
While the adversarial system emphasizes rights, the inquisitorial emphasizes duties. 86
While the adversarial calls for emancipation, the inquisitorial calls for control. 87

84

For comparisons between the common law and the civil law systems with respect to adversarial and
inquisitorial civil procedures, see MARY ANN GLENON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITION IN A
NUTSHELL 95-99, 235-242 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter GLENON ET AL]; see also KONARD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 264-284 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter ZWEIGERT &
KOTZ].
85

Cf. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for Process Values, 60
CORNELL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (arguing that a legal process can be good not only as a means to good
results but also as a means of implementing the values of this process).
86

See A. G. Chloros, Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law: Three Leading Systems of the World,
Three Kinds of Legal Though, 9 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11, 14-15, 17-19 (1978) [hereinafter Chloros].
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See Id.
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Historically, adversarialism has always been associated with individualistic cultures in
which individual liberties transcend government power.88 As Oscar G. Chase put it,
"[there] is an antipathy toward bureaucracy, hierarchical ordering. . ."89

Thus, the

fairness of trial outcomes is believed to be linked to the diminished powers of the judge
in trial proceedings.90
On the other hand, inquisitorial systems are most common in cultures where the state
maintains law and order by virtue of its paternal authority for which everyone has to pay
respect.91 There is no clamor for liberty as much as for discipline. 92 To this end, judges
are endowed with full control over the fact-finding process in order to get to the truth
themselves.

B. Technique.

1. The Adversarial Process

Given the fact that judicial authority is viewed askance, it is the parties, in adversarial
systems, who dominate the evidence and fact gathering process.93 Each party is given the
privilege of choosing which evidence to present. They have the right to select and cross-

88

See John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives Opinions,
3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L.REV. 1 (1998).
89

Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 18 (1997)
[hereinafter Chase].
90

See Lara M. Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the Differences Between Cultures Still Influence
International Commercial Arbitration Despite Harmonization? 9 ILSA J. INT'L& COMP. L. 57, 62
(2002) [hereinafter Pair]
91

See Chloros, supra note 86, at 17-19.

92

See Id.

93

ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 281.
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examine witnesses.94 The same thing applies to appointing and examining experts.95 They
also have the right to request from each disclosure of certain evidence or document,
which is known by the right to discovery. 96 While the evidence is being presented by the
parties, judges are all ears.97 They observing the game from their bench and only
intervene if one of the parties breaks the rules or asks for help.98 They can also question
the witness, but they are not expected to do that very often. There is a statement that sums
up the passivity of judges in adversarial proceedings: "[a judge who] descends into the
arena . . . is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict."99
Another corollary of the unreliability of judges' power is jury trial. Indeed, it is this
element that unpacks a bundle of techniques with which adversarial proceedings acquired
their distinctive status. 100 At the outset, since the jury panel is composed of laymen, that
historically were illiterate, evidence is primarily presented to them in an oral fashion. 101
This justifies, and at the same time explains, the heavy dependence on oral evidence
rather than written documents in the adversarial trial in general. Equally important, given
that the jury members are impaneled on a part-time basis, it is difficult to constantly
summon them. 102 Therefore, the trial is consolidated into a single continuous "event"103
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Id.

95

Id.
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For an elaborate analysis of the disclosure of documents technique with respect to commercial
arbitration, see generally Wendy Ho, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 199 (1997) (hereinafter Wendy).
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ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 282.

98

Id.
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Id. (quoting Lord Green, Yuill v. Yuill (1945), at 15-20).
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Id. at 280 (stating that "[o]ne decisive fact explains many of the peculiarities of Anglo-American
procedure: it is that the procedure results from the jury trial.").
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See GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 239.
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See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 280; see also, H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF
THE WORLD 212 (2000) (stating that jurors have day jobs).
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This term is used in GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 240.
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proceeding without interruption until its termination by a ruling. 104 This also has a
significant impact on the style of adversarial proceedings. It virtually dissects the process
into pre-trial and in-trial. As a result, lawyers have to shape their case before trial in order
to avoid any uncertainties in this one-time-shot process.105 They actively gather evidence
supporting their client's claim. 106 They also select witnesses and interview them assuring
exactly what they will say in trial. 107 Even more, they have the right to seek help from
their opponents asking for disclosure of any information or documents that pertain to the
case. 108
By the time trial commences, parties will have constructed their cases, set up their
arguments, assembled their evidence, and prepared their witness. Meanwhile, the judge
does not even have a clue about what the dispute is about.109 This actually explains to a
considerable extent why the parties should be in the vanguard in presenting evidence and
facts as they are more knowledgeable about their case than the judge really is. With the
foregoing, although afraid of being censured with oversimplification, I've tried to show
that the adversarial process is an edifice of complex structures that are built upon each
other, the basis of which is the passive role of the judge and the presence of a jury.

104

For a thorough discussion of the repercussion of consolidated and discontinuous trials, see generally
ARTHUR VON MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, A GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 75-82
(1989) [hereinafter MEHREN].
105

Id. at 80.
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Id.
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Id, This behavior is considered unethical in inquisitorial systems, see ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note
84, at 281.
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2- The Inquisitorial Process

If the point of departure in adversarial proceedings is passivity on the part of the judge, it
is the opposite in inquisitorial trials. After pleadings have been submitted by the parties,
judges assume a proactive role in managing proceedings and gathering evidence. 110 They
ask parties to produce evidence and documents. 111 They may depose and examine
witnesses themselves rather than the parties. 112 As the trial proceeds, judges may
introduce new theories and issues. 113 They are actually vested with the task of framing
and reformulating the issues of the case with the aim of facilitating and expediting
settlement.114 Parties help in achieving this goal by producing documents, selecting
witnesses; but the lead is given to the judge. To depict this dynamic job of the judge in
inquisitorial trials, let me quote the following:

[T]he German judge sits high and exalted over the parties, dominating the
courtroom scene; at the same time he is constantly descending to the level of the
litigants, as an examiner, patient or hectoring, as counselor and adviser, as
insistent promoter of settlement.115

Since inquisitorial trials are conducted in the absence of jurors, by contrast to
adversary proceedings, a gamut of consequences ensues. The inquisitorial trial is a
process of continuous hearings and meetings that take place over a period of time, in
which evidence and facts are presented to the judge. 116 The need for a single concentrated
110

See Chase, supra note 89, at 3.

111

Id. at 4.

112

Id at 4-5.
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GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 96.
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Id.
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Chase, supra note 89, at 5 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer,
Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1472(1958)).
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See GLENON ET AL., supra note 84, at 95-96.
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trial, a la adversarial, vanishes as there is no necessity to collect a group of often busy
people for whom the facts are presented.117 Thus, there is no watershed between pre-trial
and in-trial procedures. Parties can not ask each other, as a right, to disclose information
before trial. If it is necessary in adversarial proceedings to prepare for the case
beforehand to avoid ambiguities, parties in inquisitorial proceedings can ask for
adjournment to another session if they come across anything they deem worthy of
study.118 Also consequential, parties can not approach witnesses before, or even after, the
trial starts as this is considered a conduct of "improper influence". 119
To sort out the chaff from the grain, I'll sum up the main differences between
adversarial and inquisitorial processes:

1- Evidence

Adversarial trials depend heavily on oral evidence more than written documents. As
stated above, this derives from the fact that the facts of the case are decided by a jury of
commoners. Live evidence is believed to be more persuasive than papers. 120 Conversely,
inquisitorial judges rely on written documents as they can extract facts more quickly from
papers than lengthy testimonies and oral arguments.121
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See id. at 97.

118

See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 281.
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Id., see also MEHREN, supra note 104, at 81 (stating that "[t]he rationale advanced is that fresh and
unrehearsed testimony is inherently more reliable than testimony given by witnesses who have already
discussed the case with one of the lawyers.").
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See Pair, supra note 90, at 63.
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2- Witnesses

In adversarial proceedings parties can be deposed as witnesses, while in inquisitorial
systems this is unfamiliar and even proscribed. 122 Moreover, presenting witnesses and
cross-examining them is undertaken by parties as this is the best way to ascertain their
credibility; but this is, generally, the job of inquisitorial judges with some help from the
parties. 123

3- Discovery of Documents

Disclosure of documents, especially before trial, is an important technique in adversarial
trials. As discussed above, this stems in part from the fact that parties have to be
acquainted with their case in order to be prepared for the trial event. While the trial-event
concept in inquisitorial proceedings does not exist, there is no inter-partisan activity
before trial. And even if discovery exists, it is always restricted by privacy
considerations.124

4- Record-Keeping

The recording of the proceedings and witness statements in adversarial and inquisitorial
processes manifests itself in a manner that is consistent with the rationale of each side.
Since the adversarial system places considerable significance on oral evidence, witness
testimony is kept in a verbatim transcript, in order for lawyers to utilize every possible
122

Id. at 65.

123

Id. at 65-66.

124

Id. at 64.
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word in confronting witnesses by cross-examination.125 But while this is not the approach
of the inquisitorial system, judges just take notes of testimonies composing a summary of
what has been said. 126
By and large, while both systems may possibly overlap, we have always to remind
ourselves that the "grand discriminant" 127 between them is the active role of the judge vis
a vis party control. Indeed, this point should inform our analysis of any potential
procedural systems should we wish to recognize their systemic nature.
Having exposed the philosophy and technique of both adversarial and inquisitorial
processes, let's now turn to analyze the arbitration proceedings of the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris and the Cairo Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration in order to know to which procedural system they belong.
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Lawrence W. Newman, International Arbitration Hearings: Showdown or Denouement? 5 TUL. J.
INT'L &COMP. L. 3933, 395-396 (1997) [hereinafter Newman].
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Id.
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This term was used by John Langbein when describing the difference between American and
German procedural systems stating that the "grand discriminant between the two legal cultures [is]
adversarial versus judicial responsibility for gathering and presenting the facts", John Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 863 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein].
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Chapter IV: Institutional Procedural Rules

In this chapter, I will analyze the procedural rules of two major international arbitral
institutions, namely, the Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). My
objective here is to observe how the arbitral process proceeds according to the rules of
these two institutions and, thereby, determine the nature of their procedural systems; is it
adversarial, inquisitorial, or an amalgam of both? Therefore, I will emphasize the rules
that are most conducive to this aim. It should be noted, furthermore, that choosing these
two institutions is far from gratuitous. On the one hand, the ICC is the oldest and most
well-established arbitral institution all over the world. 128 On the other hand, the CRCICA
is a relatively new-player in the international arbitration market. 129 It will be interesting,
thus, to know on which procedural yardstick old and new arbitral institutions conduct
their arbitrations.
Examining the procedural rules of the ICC130 and the CRCICA131 from an
adversarial/inquisitorial perspective involves the following:
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See generally W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
(2d ed. 1990); see also Eric A. Schwartz, The Resolution of International Commercial Disputes Under
the Auspices of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 719
(1994-1995).
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See generally M.I.M Aboul Enein, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the Cairo Regional Centre for
Commercial Arbitration, I NT'L T AX & BUS. LAW 256 (1986).
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See International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (Jan. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf_documents/rules/rules_arb_english.pdf.
(hereinafter ICC Rules).
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Arbitration Rules of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (Oct. 1,
2000), available at http://www.crcica.org.eg/arbitration_rules.html. (hereinafter CRCICA Rules).
Please note that the Cairo centre is currently amending its arbitration rules, the draft amendment of
these rules is available at http://www.crcica.org.eg/CRCICA_New_English_Rules.pdf.
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A. Initiation of the proceedings.
B. The Role of the Arbitral Institution.
C. The Role of the Arbitral Tribunal.
D. The Role of the Parties.
E. Hearings.
F. Witnesses and Experts.
G. Discovery.

A. Initiation of the Proceedings

Under the ICC procedural system, the arbitral process kicks off with a "request" lodged
by the claimant to the secretariat of the International Court of Arbitration (the arbitral
body of the ICC) which, on its part, informs the respondent of the receipt of this request
and the date of such receipt;132 this date serves as the opening date of the arbitral
process.133
But this technique differs when shifting to the CRCICA procedural rules; in that the
claimant gives a "notice" to the respondent expressing its need to resort to arbitration. 134
The date on which the respondent receives such notice is considered to be the date of
initiating arbitration. 135
This is to illustrate the active role of the parties under the CRCICA rules in initiating
the arbitral process, while there is a considerable involvement by the arbitral institution in
such process under the ICC rules.

132

ICC Rules, supra note 130, art. 4(1).

133

Id. art. 4(2).

134

CRCICA Rules, supra note 131, art. 3(1).

135

Id. art. 3(2).
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B. The Role of the Arbitral Institution

The arbitral body of the ICC is the International Court of Arbitration (the ICC Court). 136
It functions independently of the ICC to ascertain the settlement by arbitration of
international, or non-international, commercial disputes in tandem with the ICC rules of
arbitration. 137
In contrast, the CRCICA does not have a parallel arbitration court, and it does not
even play that pivotal role which is assumed by the ICC International Court of
Arbitration in administering the arbitral process. To single out this role on the part of the
ICC court, I will compare the ICC and the CRCICA arbitration rules with respect to two
areas, the establishment of the arbitral tribunal and rendering the award.

1- Establishing the Arbitral Tribunal

The ICC court plays a salient part in establishing the arbitral tribunal. It enjoys ample
powers in appointing and confirming arbitrators. 138 From the outset, in case the parties
do not agree upon the number of arbitrators, the ICC court appoints a sole arbitrator,
unless the ICC court estimates that the dispute needs to be settled by three arbitrators. 139
If it does, each party then has to nominate one arbitrator.140 In case the parties agree to
appoint one arbitrator for settling their dispute, they have to agreeably nominate one

136

ICC Rules, supra note 130, art. 1(1). To get yourself acquainted with this court, see id, appendix I
(Statute of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC) & appendix II (Internal Rules of the
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC).
137

ICC rules arts. 1(1), 1(2).

138

Id. art. 9.
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arbitrator; this nomination is nonetheless subject to the ICC court's confirmation. 141 But if
they fail to do so, this arbitrator should be appointed by the ICC court.142 In case the
parties agree to appoint three arbitrators, each party has to nominate one arbitrator to be
confirmed by the ICC court.143 The third arbitrator is to be appointed then by the ICC
court, provided the parties did not agree on nominating this arbitrator themselves or by
any other means.144 In the latter situation, as the case always is, this nomination is subject
to the ICC court's confirmation.145 Again, if the parties fail to nominate the third
arbitrator within certain periods of time, the ICC court should appoint this arbitrator.146 In
addition to these powers in appointing and confirming arbitrators, the ICC court assumes
an equal clout in cases of challenging 147 or replacing148 arbitrators.
When we turn our attention to the CRCICA, establishing the arbitral tribunal is mainly
vested in the parties. That is why I will discuss it in relative details in the forthcoming
section of The Role of the Parties. Suffice it to note here that the arbitral institution under
the CRCICA rules appoints arbitrators or designate appointing authorities only if the
parties ask it to make such appointment or designation in certain cases.149
2- Rendering the Award

141

Id. art. 8(3).
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Id.
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Id. art 8(4).
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Arbitral awards under both the ICC and the CRCICA procedural rules are rendered by a
majority, reasoned decision.150 However, the ICC empowers its court with a distinctive
function to ensure the proper application of its arbitration rules. The tribunal should
present a draft form of the award to the court in order to review and approve it. 151
Rendering the award is contingent upon such approval by the court. 152 It may possibly
adjust the form of the award as it sees fit, and it can also give notice to the tribunal with
respect to substantial issues. 153 The same applies to any correction or interpretation
directed to the award by the tribunal. 154 It should be noted, furthermore, that the court
members, when reviewing the draft award, bear in their minds the mandatory law of the
place in which arbitration takes place. 155 That actually raises a question pertaining to
potential contradictions between mandatory law provisions and the arbitral agreement,
which one overweigh the other? I will answer this question when writing my comments
at the end of this part.

C. The Role of the Arbitral Tribunal

The arbitral tribunal plays a very proactive role in administering the arbitral process
under the ICC arbitration rules. To begin with, the tribunal is vested with the task of
drawing up, in the presence of the parties, the terms of reference which include, inter
alia, the claims of the parties and the issues to be determined. 156 Also, the tribunal is

150

ICC Rules, arts. 25(1), 25(2); CRCICA Rules arts. 31(1), 32(3).
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presumed to establish, with help from the parties, a timetable by which arbitration should
proceed.157 Most importantly, the tribunal assumes the responsibility of establishing the
facts of the case as expeditiously as possible by every proper manner, 158 provided the
parties are treated fairly and impartially. 159 To this end, it is "in full charge of the
hearings".160 It can, with assistance from the parties, appoint experts and decide to hear
witnesses.161 It may ask any party to provide additional evidence. 162 It can order, in
response to parties' demand, conservatory or interim measures. 163 Further, it can ask the
ICC court to extend the time limit for rendering the final award. 164 Finally, the tribunal
may close the proceedings when it rests assured that the parties presented their respective
sides with a "reasonable opportunity".165 Before shifting to the CRCICA rules, I would
like to draw your attention that the ICC rules in their final article assign the tribunal, and
the court, with the task of ensuring that the award will be "enforceable at law". 166 Could
this be at the expense of the expectations of the parties? In other words, are the tribunal
and the court entitled to disregard the provisions of the arbitration agreement in order to
make sure that the award will be enforceable? I will get to this point in my final
comments.
Under the CRCICA procedural rules, the arbitral tribunal has the privilege of
conducting the arbitration by any means it sees fit as long as the parties are treated
157

Id. art. 18(4).
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equally and fairly. 167 The tribunal can hold a preliminary meeting with the parties in
order to sign the terms of reference and set a procedural timetable for running the
arbitration. 168 Besides the statements of claim and defense, the tribunal can ask the parties
to submit additional written statements. 169 Further, the tribunal can order the production
of documents or evidence upon which the parties depend in their statements of claim or
defense or any other documents or evidence within certain periods of time as the tribunal
decides.170 If any party requests, the tribunal can order any appropriate interim
measure.171 It can also appoint experts to uncover certain intricacies. 172
It should be noted, in addition, that the CRCICA tribunal can at its own discretion
prolong the time limits provided for the communication by the parties of statements of
claim and defense. 173 And it reserves the right to terminate or continue the proceedings in
case the claimant fails to communicate its statements of claim or the respondent fails to
communicate its statement of defense, respectively, within fixed periods of time. 174 Also,
the tribunal may go on with a hearing even though one of the parties does not show up.175
It can decide the case on the available evidence in case one of the parties does not
provide for the documentary evidence required from it. 176 At last, having made sure the
parties have presented their cases satisfactorily, the tribunal can order the closure of
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hearings;177 nonetheless, it can reopen them discretionally or pursuant to a plea from a
party for "exceptional circumstances". 178
From the foregoing, the active role of both ICC and CRCICA tribunals is obvious, but
it is more conspicuous under the ICC rules.

D. The Role of the Parties

As demonstrated above, parties to an arbitration under the ICC Rules play a subordinate
role to that of the ICC court in establishing the arbitral tribunal. Even after the
establishment of that tribunal, their role remains typical of its auxiliary character. Here
are some of the privileges given to the parties while participating in ICC arbitrations. At
first, they take part ab initio in drawing up the terms of reference and the procedural
timetable. 179 They are entitled to a "reasonable opportunity" for presenting their
positions.180 Moreover, they are entitled to a hearing 181 in which they can question
experts appointed by the tribunal. 182 They can also appoint witnesses and experts. 183 Also
noteworthy, parties can agree between themselves to shorten the time limits provided for
by ICC Rules.184 However, this agreement is subject to the approval of the arbitral
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tribunal185 and the discretion of the ICC court to extend any time limit curtailed by the
parties. 186
On the other hand, the role of the parties to CRCICA arbitrations is by no means
minor. Initially, they participate vigorously in establishing the arbitral tribunal. In case of
appointment of one arbitrator, they may agree between each other on the name of such
arbitrator, or the appointing authority to make such appointment. 187 If neither technique
worked out, they can ask the CRCICA to make such appointment.188 Further, in case of
agreeing to settle the dispute by three arbitrators, each party should appoint one arbitrator
and the two appointed arbitrators should agree between themselves upon the third
presiding arbitrator.189 If any of the parties refrained from appointing its arbitrator, the
other can ask the appointing authority, previously agreed upon by the parties, to make
such appointment; and if this ended in vain or the appointing authority did not exist from
the beginning, the CRCICA should appoint such arbitrator or designate the appointing
authority upon request from this party. 190 If the two appointed arbitrators did not manage
to agree on the third one, the appointing authority should make this appointment,
following the same foregoing procedures.191 Parties, also, can agree on the number and
means of appointing arbitrators in case of multi-party arbitrations; and if they fail, the
CRCICA kicks in to establish the tribunal upon request from the parties. 192 Equally
notable, parties participate in the processes of challenging and replacing arbitrators. 193
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Furthermore, unlike the case with ICC arbitrations, the burden of proof with respect to
the facts of a case submitted to CRCICA arbitration lies on the parties. 194 Therefore,
parties are entitled to a "full opportunity" for presenting their cases. 195 They can ask for a
hearing in order to present witnesses, experts or for oral arguments. 196 They can, also,
examine experts appointed by the tribunal and present their own expert witnesses who
give testimony on contentious issues. 197

E. Hearings

As stated above, parties under both ICC and CRCICA procedural rules are entitled to
hold hearings in which oral evidence is presented, witnesses are heard, and experts are
examined. Nonetheless, this right turns into a discretionary tool in the hands of the
tribunal unless the parties avail themselves of it. In other words, if neither one of the
parties requests a hearing, it is merely up to the tribunal to hold such a hearing or to
determine the case only on the basis of written documents or other materials submitted to
it.198
In tandem with the confidentiality of arbitration, moreover, hearings are not held in
public without parties' approval. 199 Also, persons alien to the arbitral process are denied
access to it without the authorization of both the tribunal and the parties. 200
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F. Witnesses and Experts

Parties under both the ICC and the CRCICA procedural rules have the privilege, as stated
above, to present witnesses and experts. The tribunals of both institutions have the power,
also, to appoint experts to report on certain issues. Notably, the rules of both institutions
give the parties the right to examine only experts appointed by the tribunal. There is no
reference whatsoever to any powers conferred upon the parties to examine, let alone
cross-examine, witnesses or experts initially presented by them.
In addition, with an adversarial attitude, the CRCICA rules, at odds with ICC rules,
consider signed written statements of witnesses "affidavits" valid evidence. 201

G. Discovery

There are two provisions in CRCICA rules that bear some resemblance to those articles
which provide for disclosure of documents as practiced in adversarial systems. The first
states that "[a]ll documents or information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party
shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the other party." 202 The second
states the following:
The arbitral tribunal may, if it considers it appropriate, require a party to
deliver to the tribunal and to the other party . . . a summary of the documents
and other evidence which that party intends to present in support of the facts in
issue set out in his statement of claim or statement of defense. 203
If we consider such approach to be a discovery of documents, there is not an
equivalent to it in ICC rules.
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After analyzing the procedural systems of both institutions, I will consume some lines
to make the following arguments:
First, under the ICC procedural system, the helm of the arbitral process is assumed by
both the International Court of Arbitration and the arbitral tribunal, with assistance from
the parties. The court maintains a strong grip over appointing arbitrators and rendering
awards, by virtue of its approval capacities. The arbitral tribunal also dominates the
conduct of the proceedings by the vast powers vested in it by the ICC rules. Further, this
dominant role on the part of both the court and the tribunal gets all the more vigorous by
the fact that the court considers, when reviewing awards, the mandatory law of the place
of arbitration, 204 and the fact that they both have to ensure the enforceability of these
awards.205 This possibly implies that the tribunal, when deciding disputes, and the court,
when reviewing awards, can set aside some provisions the parties have explicitly
stipulated in their arbitral agreement for the sake of bowing down to the mandatory law
of the place of arbitration, and for guaranteeing the enforceability of the prospective
award. Indeed, this puts into question the commitment on the part of both the court and
the tribunal to a fundamental arbitral principle, namely, party autonomy, and sheds,
thereby, some curtains of doubt over the suitability of the active roles of both the court
and the tribunal with the values of international commercial arbitration.
Second, while the arbitral tribunal under the CRCICA rules is actively involved in the
conduct of the proceedings, the parties also assume a dynamic part in pushing the arbitral
process forward. As stated earlier, they initially start the arbitral process with no support
from the CRCICA; they are vested with the task of appointing arbitrators; they also
shoulder the responsibility of proving the facts of their cases. Therefore, under the
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CRCICA rules, the progression of arbitration is an undertaking divided equally between
the arbitral tribunal and the parties.
Third, the procedural systems of both the ICC and the CRCICA have a lot in common,
such as deciding the dispute only of the basis of documents in case neither party requests
a hearing. However, the ICC rules are distinctive with some inquisitorial techniques, such
as the powerful grip of the ICC court and tribunal over the proceedings. And the
CRCICA rules are distinctive with some adversarial features, namely, affidavit evidence,
and, as I may call it, "distorted" discovery of documents.
Fourth, although CRCICA rules embrace the above stated adversarial techniques, they
lack many features that are eponymous of the adversarial system, and indeed vital in
measuring the adversariality of a given procedural system, for instance, the dichotomy of
the trial process into pre-trial and in-trial. Equally noteworthy, cross-examination of
witnesses and experts is nonexistent. As stated above, the only kind of examination is
mentioned with regard to experts appointed by the tribunal rather than the parties. Also,
the concept of a hearing, in which oral evidence is submitted, is not clearly underscored,
as the tribunal can do without a hearing and decide the dispute on the bases of documents
absent the parties request for a hearing.
Fifth, against this background, I can say that the ICC arbitration rules are purely
inquisitorial; the tribunal and the ICC court are in the vanguard of the arbitral process;
parties are only assistants; hearings are not mandatory and the tribunal can decide the
dispute only on the basis of documents; all adversarial techniques are absent. On the
other hand, I can not say that the CRCICA rules are either adversarial or inquisitorial;
leading the proceedings is divided between the tribunal and the parties; the concept of a
hearing is not given prevalence; although there are some adversarial techniques, others
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are not established. Thus, in my view, these rules are an amalgam of both the adversarial
and the inquisitorial systems.
Having consulted the ICC and the CRCICA about which procedural system is most
convenient with international commercial arbitration, let's do the same with international
arbitrators themselves.
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Chapter V: Opinions of International Arbitrators

In this chapter, I will explore the opinions of five Egyptian international arbitrators about
which procedural system, i.e., adversarial or inquisitorial, better fits with international
commercial arbitration. Their opinions were obtained through interviews conducted
personally with them, save for Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein whom I interviewed by
telephone. I held interviews with other international arbitrators, but I chose to display
only the opinions of these five for purposes of conciseness as they embrace all potential
answers to my question. These arbitrators are: Dr. Karim Hafez, Sarwat Abdel-Shahid,
Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein, Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Ra'oof, and Dr. Mohamed Badran. 206

A. Dr. Karim Hafez207

Dr. Hafez believes that it is impossible to determine the suitability of either adversarial or
inquisitorial proceedings with international arbitration in general because there is no
arbitral yardstick against which we can do so. There is no monolithic culture of
arbitration that encompasses general principles and features with which a set of
procedures fits and another does not. The culture of arbitration is amoebic. It has no
uniform character. It includes different types of arbitration with different attributes. There
is maritime arbitration, construction arbitration, petroleum extraction arbitration, and so
on. Although they are all international and commercial, every kind has its exigencies that
call for a certain type of procedure. For example, the adversarial system might fit with
maritime arbitration, given the fact that the substantive law that applies to this kind o f

206

These names are put in an alphabetical order.

207

Attorney at law; international arbitrator; LL.M., LL.D., Cambridge University.

41

arbitration is affected by British common law and the attorneys representing parties are
mainly British. Meanwhile, this system might not fit with other types of arbitration such
as construction arbitration.
Moreover, the suitability of any of the two procedural systems with international
arbitration, Dr. Hafez thinks, raises no problems in practice. All participants of
international arbitration, whether arbitrators, parties, or institutions, no longer maintain
these dogmatic predilections with respect to a certain procedural system. Their exposure
to different legal systems makes them more receptive to procedures of other cultures.
When empanelled as an arbitrator, Dr. Hafez provides, he does not care whether he
follows adversarial or inquisitorial procedures. He just attempts to respect the
expectations of the parties and the cultural background of his colleagues on the arbitral
panel. In sum, Dr. Hafez does not believe there is an international arbitration culture out
there that is consistent with one procedural system over another. This issue has to be
determined on a case by case basis. 208

B. Sarwat Abdel-Shahid209

Mr. Abdel-Shahid considers the adversarial system more appropriate for international
arbitration than the inquisitorial system. In his view, the latter corresponds to the most
important principle of international arbitration, i.e., party autonomy. Plus, it achieves a
speedy settlement of the arbitral dispute by empowering parties and giving them a
dominant role over the proceedings, as direct communication between them is the best
way to expedite the arbitral process. With respect to truthfulness, it is the adversarial
208
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system that is closer to achieving this value. By techniques such as discovery of
documents, no party can hide any document or evidence that is crucial to reach the truth.
Additionally, this technique allows the arbitral tribunal to ensure the real intentions of the
parties. Cross-examinations is also a vital technique to uncover the truth. With the parties
examining each other's witnesses and disproving each other's arguments, the arbitrator
can tell which argument is more truthful. Overall, Mr. Abdel-Shahid deems the
adversarial system not only more suitable for international arbitration, but generally
superior to the inquisitorial system. 210

C. Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein211

Dr. Aboul-Enein does not favor one procedural system over the other. He deems one of
the most valuable advantages of arbitration to be its procedural flexibility that permits the
parties to tailor the arbitral proceedings according to their needs and the nature of their
dispute. By reason of this flexibility, parties can combine the best techniques in both
systems in their arbitration. On the one hand, Dr. Aboul-Enein prefers the arbitrator to
have a dominant role over the proceedings. The arbitrator should appoint experts,
question witnesses, and ask parties to provide further evidence. This guarantees an
efficient and speedy resolution of the arbitral dispute; and it prevents the stronger party
from overshadowing the weaker. On the other hand, he prefers such adversarial
techniques as cross-examination and discovery of documents. They are also required for
an efficient resolution of the dispute. But still they both should be under the supervision
of the judge, particularly, discovery of document. It should not be as expansively
210
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practiced as in U.S. courts; such expansion would encumber the arbitral process and
render it less speedy. 212

D. Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Raoof213

In Dr. Abdel-Raoof's view, the procedural system that best comports with international
arbitration is the one that is most conducive to its objectives, namely, justice, efficiency,
speed, and flexibility. The inquisitorial system is more fulfilling of these goals. The
active role of the arbitrator guarantees the just and efficient resolution of the arbitral
dispute. To illustrate the significance of this role, Dr. Abdel-Raoof recalled a personal
experience. In one of the arbitral disputes in which he was impaneled as an arbitrator,
there was a document that one party was supposed to submit. This party did not submit
this document and the other two arbitrators were not willing to ask for its submission. Dr.
Abdel-Raoof managed to convince his colleagues to change their passive attitude. They
then ordered this party to present the required document. Surprisingly, this document was
so vital to the extent that it changed their previous approach to the dispute. On the other
hand, Dr. Abdel-Raoof considers such adversarial techniques as discovery of documents
and verbatim record-keeping time-consuming and impractical. However, he sometimes
permit parties to cross-examine each other's witnesses but under his control and
supervision.214
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E. Dr. Mohamed Badran215

Dr. Badran believes, at the outset, that it is difficult to determine the consistency of either
system with international arbitration without accompanying cultural inclinations. Those
of common law countries think that their adversarial system is fairer and more efficient
and therefore more suitable with international arbitration. The same applies to those of
civil law countries with respect to their procedural system. However, in my interview
with him, Dr. Badran tried to give his cultural bias a break in order to determine the
suitability of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures with international arbitration. He
deems the inquisitorial system more proximate to fairness and justice at the expense of
practicality. By contrast, the adversarial system is more flexible and practical but to the
detriment of fairness and justice. In his view, that stems from the fact that the
inquisitorial system grew in the civil law system which was developed by scholars and
academics who put rigid principle to govern people's dealings with little regard for the
constantly changing circumstances. But the adversarial system matured in the common
law system which was developed by traders and merchants who were all the more keen to
establish flexible rules to cope with different times. Thus, since parties resort to
international arbitration for its flexibility, it is the adversarial system that responds to
their expectations.216
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After displaying these five opinions, I will make the following comments:
First, all opinions approach the suitability issue from different perspectives. Two of
them favor the adversarial system, one favors the inquisitorial, one favors a mixture of
both systems, and one basically deems this suitability inconceivable.
Second, I do not share with Dr. Hafez his view that there is no arbitral standard with
which we can determine the compatibility of either procedural system with international
arbitration. It might be true that there are various types of arbitration, each one
maintaining an exclusive nature. However, that does not mean that there is no
overarching arbitration culture, under which all kinds of arbitration share common
features and objectives that distinguish them from ordinary court litigation. As I stated in
part one of this paper, party autonomy, neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and
confidentiality are all features that should attend the arbitral process. Without these
features, international arbitration loses its raison d'etre. Thus, we can assess the
suitability of any potential procedural system with international arbitration by invoking
such features.
Third, although Dr. Aboul-Enein favors a mishmash of adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures, his attitude essentially favors the inquisitorial system. Given the fact that the
main difference between the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems is the passive vis a
vis active role of the judge, and since Dr. Aboul-Enein supports an active role of the
arbitrator, he actually drifts towards the inquisitorial system. His support for such
adversarial techniques as discovery of documents and cross-examination is of little
significance here, since they should be conducted, in his view, under the control of the
arbitrator.
Fourth, Dr. Badran's analysis is too general to determine the attributes of both
adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings. Rather than examining the real mechanisms of
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both systems, he puts all his credit in evaluating the cultural backgrounds of their
respective parent systems. Although supportive, cultural underpinnings should not divert
our attention from analyzing the actual procedural devices of adversarial and inquisitorial
processes in the pursuit of identifying their features. Moreover, Dr. Badran's analysis just
tackles the law-making rationale of common law and civil law systems, with no regard
for the direct cultural justifications for trial proceedings in both systems. He does not
explain why judges in common law systems should remain passive throughout the trial
process while their civilian counterparts remain active, and how this informs the
character of the trial. In sum, Dr. Badran's analysis, in my view, lacks the required
specificity to capture the real characteristics of the adversarial and the inquisitorial
systems.
Fifth, although they reach the same conclusion, Mr. Abdel-Shahid deviates from the
road taken by Dr. Badran in his analysis. He emphasizes the very techniques of the
adversarial system, considering them more compatible with the principles of international
arbitration.
That said, let me now give my personal opinion about which procedural system better
fits with the international commercial arbitration.
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Chapter VI: Which Is Better?

In this chapter, I will measure the proximity of both adversarial and inquisitorial systems
to the normative attributes of international commercial arbitration which I set out in part
one of this paper, i.e., party autonomy, neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and
confidentiality. I will explain first why it is important to know which procedural system
is more compatible with international arbitration. Then, I will proceed with my analysis
showing at the end that the inquisitorial system is generally more fulfilling to the
aspirations of those who resort to arbitration.

A. Why is it important to explore the suitability of both systems with international
arbitration?

As demonstrated earlier in this paper, arbitration is moving in the route of judicialization
and adversarialization.217 Today, adversarial techniques are noticeably taking root in the
conduct of international arbitration proceedings. It important, therefore, to scrutinize this
phenomenon to know whether the adversarial system is in harmony with international
commercial arbitration, and accordingly whether parties should utilize it in their
arbitrations.
Furthermore, given the fact that neither ad hoc nor institutional arbitration provide ab
initio for answers to the nitty-gritty of arbitration proceedings, 218 background cultural
differences between the parties to arbitration, as opposed what Dr. Hafez believes, 219
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pose a considerable threat to the predictability of its proceedings and, thereby, to the
proper resolution of arbitral disputes. 220 Possibly, one common law party might regard
discovery of documents as a means of building its case, while the other civilian party
perceives such technique, if ever has a clue of what it means, as hazardous to its
commercial secrets.221 One party might perceive cross-examination as the most efficient
way of testing witness credibility, while the other depends on the judge to do this job.
One party might prepare and coach its witness prior to standing for testimony, while the
other sees this conduct as unethical. 222
Even worse, this discrepancy finds expression in the attitudes of the arbitrators
themselves. To give an example, an arbitrator with a civil law background might regard
an extensive oral argument by a common law lawyer as superfluous and therefore
untrustworthy. 223 Meanwhile, a common law arbitrator might be dissuaded by a succinct
oral argument made by a civilian lawyer. 224 Should the scope of this paper permit, I can
enumerate a list of similar inconsistencies.
It is important, therefore, to determine, in a common law/civil law cultural vacuum,
the suitability of both adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings with international
arbitration in order for the arbitration community at large, whether parties, arbitrators, or
institutions, to cast away any cultural predilection, and adopt the very set of procedures
that is compatible with the features and objectives of international arbitration. Although it
is not that easy to root out cultural beliefs, I would be more than satisfied if answering
this question managed, even to a little extent, to do so.
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B. The Suitability of the Adversarial and the Inquisitorial Systems with the
Normative Attributes of International Commercial Arbitration.

The suitability test involves the following:

1. Party Autonomy

As demonstrated earlier, party autonomy is one of the most basic principles of
international arbitration. 225 It is the very right that authorizes parties to eschew judicial
jurisdiction and opt for arbitration. Similarly, it is the same principle that characterizes
adversarial trials and gives reason to many of its taken-for-granted techniques, such as
cross-examination and discovery. Indeed, both the adversarial system and arbitration
share in common the philosophy of sidelining state power, incarnated in its judicial
authority, in favor of party independence and domination. Parties in both institutions do
not trust the government to administer their disputes. They prefer to sort out their own
affairs themselves.
In contrast, the inquisitorial system detracts from the autonomy of the parties to
arbitration. It confers more control over the arbitral process upon the arbitral tribunal
rather than the parties. They just assist the tribunal to decide their dispute. In that sense,
the inquisitorial system contradicts with the autonomy rights of the parties with which
they are entitled to initiate their arbitration in the first place. I illustrated this
contradiction when analyzing the arbitration rules of the ICC. 226 By virtue, of the vast
powers vested in them in administering the arbitral process, the ICC court and the arbitral
tribunal may disregard manifest provisions the parties have agreed upon. It follows, then,
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that the adversarial system is more fulfilling of that aspect of arbitration than its
inquisitorial counterpart. It is the system that corresponds with and supplements the
autonomy of the parties when conducting arbitration. But, does that suffice to conclude
that the adversarial system is generally more compatible with arbitration than the
inquisitorial? Of course it does not. Parties do not turn to arbitration just for exercising
their autonomy; there are other considerations that should not fall out of our evaluation.
Let's move on with the suitability test.

2. Neutrality

Contesting parties from different countries resort to international arbitration, as noted
above, because they fear they will not be afforded justice by each other's national
courts.227 Impartiality and justice are, indeed, significant targets that parties aspire to
attain by going to arbitration. Let's now see how adversarial and inquisitorial systems
work to achieve these valuable concepts.
Some commentators argue that since inquisitorial judges must have prior knowledge
of the case before them in order to be effective managers at trial, they unwittingly
develop intuitive preconceptions and hypotheses that tend to be in favor of one side rather
than the other.228 This bias informs the kind of questions judges raise at trial and, even
worse, the receptiveness of information gathered generally through the whole process. 229
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But this is not the case with adversarial judges as they do not know about the case prior to
trial. 230
Although at first blush makes some sense, this argument, if deeply looked into, proves
unpalatable. On the one hand, we can not assume that judges are necessarily biased when
they begin trial on an informational basis. Pre-informed judges are like scientific
researchers. They initiate their research with a modicum of data. Their knowledge
increases as the research process goes on. Although they might have ab initio some
preconceptions about the result of their investigation, their desire to reach the truth leads
them to find out facts that might steer them toward a totally different destination. Their
integrity and skillfulness get them back on track, should they go astray, particularly when
they know that they might harbor such inclinations. Having personal stakes or being
professionally incompetent are fairly different issues. On the other hand, it is actually the
passive role of the judge and parties domination over trial proceedings that generate this
bias. Adversarialism, I believe, lends a validation for the stronger party to overshadow
the weaker. With its capacities, resources, and techniques, the latter is more privileged to
present its case more cogently than the former. Passive judges would then fall for the
stronger argument regardless of their supposed impartiality at the outset of trial. Indeed,
bias is more rampant in the adversarial process than its inquisitorial sibling.
In addition, if we approached impartiality as the ability of trial proceedings to produce
truthful results, the balance would once again tip in favor of the inquisitorial system.
Having portrayed the modus operandi of adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings, 231 I
believe that truth evaporates with the heat of the adversarial battle. Parties are not as
much concerned with unearthing reality as they are with winning their contest. As an
American judge once put it,"[the] adversary system rates truth too low among the values
230
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that institutions of justice are meant to serve." 232 On the contrary, and as the case always
is, the inquisitorial judge leads keenly the locomotive of trial until it arrives at the station
of truth.
Let's see for example how things work with respect to witness testimonies. Due to the
fact that lawyers can hold interviews with prospective witnesses, this contact, as stated
above, turns into a means of informing witnesses what they are going to say in trial. This
actually emasculates the veracity of the testimony as witnesses take sides in the dispute
according to the party that selected them, regardless of the truthfulness of their
statements.233 Even if cross-examination is utilized to counteract this deficiency, it is
deemed to be inefficient itself as it is always subject to intimidation and trickery. 234
On the other extreme, inquisitorial procedural ethics prohibit party-witness contact.
There is neither coaching nor preparation of witnesses. They are selected by the judge
with assistance, rather than supervision, from the parties. Testimonies are kept intact until
uttered in court. Examination is undertaken by an impartial judge who is eager to get to
the truth. Thus, truth is preserved in a twofold way; on the one hand, it is protected from
distortions; on the other, it is afforded an appropriate avenue to get out through.
Mirjan Damaska recognized this truth-seeking discrepancy between adversarial and
inquisitorial models in an article written by him around twenty years ago.235 Although
his arguments relate to criminal trials, two of them fit with, and therefore merit
importation into, this analysis of civil procedure.236 Damaska argues that in the
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adversarial model, emphasis is placed more on observing the rules of the contest between
adversaries than the truthful determination of the facts of the case. 237 But in the nonadversarial model "the concern for ascertaining the facts of the case is much more
central."238 Further, he attributes this truth-seeking variance to the disparate ideological
conception espoused by the two systems. Due to the fear of state power, the evidentiary
barrier in the adversarial model is so high that truth can not always overcome. 239
Conversely, since state power is not viewed with so much disdain in inquisitorial
systems, the same evidentiary obstacles found in adversarial proceedings are perceived as
being unnecessary in the pursuit of truth. 240
To round out the picture, the inquisitorial system is more bias-moderating and truthseeking than the adversarial system. As a result, the latter is more fulfilling to arbitral
neutrality than the former.

3. Efficiency

Efficiency is an important element of the arbitral process. 241 It guarantees, as set out
earlier, the final, binding, time-saving, cost-minimizing, and practical resolution of the
arbitral dispute.242 To be sure, it is the most salient feature that distinguishes arbitration
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from court litigation. With that in mind, which one of our two compared procedural
systems is more efficient?

- The Adversarial System

In fact, the adversarial process comprises a set of techniques that reflect the timeconsuming, costly, and ineffective nature of that system. With the passive role of judges
and their refraining from prompting parties to settle their dispute, the adversarial case
tends to drag on. The domination of the proceedings by the parties and their dedication to
"leave no stone unturned"243 in gathering facts takes its toll on the economy and accuracy
of this process.
For instance, in a typical discovery of documents practice, the claimant submits to the
respondent a list of every document that relates to the issues of their dispute. 244 The latter
responds with a variety of objections and a lower number of documents than requested. 245
The claimant then submits supplemental document requests with deposition demands of
every relevant person.246 Again, the respondent meets these requests and demands with
either objection or ignorance. 247 The requests and objections tend to go back and forth
adding much to the cost and time of resolving the dispute. 248 In addition, if we postulate
that discovery is needed to prevent unfair surprises in trial proceedings, 249 it still does not
match the nature of international arbitration. More to the point, discovery, when applied
243

Langbein, supra note 127, at 846.

244

Wendy, supra note 96, at 214.

245

Id.

246

See id.

247

See id.

248

See id. at 215.

249

See Alan Scott Rau and Edward F. Sherman, Symposium on International Commercial Arbitration:
Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 89, 102 (1995).

55

to arbitration proceedings, can not function as it does in adversarial systems because the
power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal are far less than what a typical court of law
enjoys. 250 Therefore, arbitrators lack direct authority to sanction noncompliance with
discovery orders and the required resources to supervise the process. 251 Even when
adverse inference is taken against recalcitrant parties, it has arguably little practical
effect.252
Another manifestation of this inefficiency on the part of the adversary system is its
inherent tendency to present evidence orally with lengthy verbal arguments comprising
irrelevant details and cross-examinations that tend, in my view, to concentrate on
impeaching witnesses rather than illuminating relevant issues. Also, the verbatim
recording of the hearings, which includes every single word uttered by parties or
witnesses, is believed to be yet another addition to the expense of the proceedings. 253
In sum, the adversary system, I believe, nurtures superfluity at the expense of
precision; it makes room for wastefulness rather than objectivity.

- The Inquisitorial System

The investigatory nature of judicial control renders inquisitorial proceedings result
oriented.254 It purges those excessive steps taken by parties to gain strategic benefits. The
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machine of fact finding goes into play only if common sense dictates.255 Judges narrow
the issues of the dispute to those most needed for its settlement.256 They rely more on
written evidence from which they can speedily extract facts and evidence. The
summarized record keeping does away with any unnecessary and tautological
statements.257 Moreover, lawyers help in drawing consideration to functional evidence or
useful facts.258 Examining witnesses is primarily undertaken by an impartial judge.
When parties question witnesses, this lengthy adversarial cross-examination is not
permitted. There is no discovery of documents as practiced in adversarial trials, and no
depositions either. In my view, by reason of the fact that there is always behind the
inquisitorial process someone, i.e., the judge, who is all the more enthusiastic to get the
dispute to a resolution, the inquisitorial system is expeditious, teleological, and, as a
result, efficient.
Form the foregoing, the inquisitorial system is more fulfilling to arbitral efficiency
than its adversarial cousin. The former is speedy, cost-saving, and objective while the
latter is sluggish, expensive, and wasteful.

4. Flexibility

The adversarial system comprises a set of such techniques and procedures as pre-trial
discovery, pre-trial depositions, cross-examinations, oral arguments, verbatim transcripts,
which reflect the complex nature of that system. This complexity stems from the fact that
adversarial techniques are rationalized by and dependent upon each other. Oral evidence
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is justified by the presence of a jury; the active role of the parties finds expression in
cross-examination, pre-trial discovery is justified by the dichotomy of trial and the fact
that parties has to be prepared before the hearing event; the verbatim transcript is
necessary for the conduct of cross-examination. To be sure, the absence of one of these
techniques detracts from the efficiency of another.
By contrast, the inquisitorial system does not maintain such a complex structure since
it is absent those concepts espoused by the adversarial system. It lack this
interdependency of procedures. There is no jury, no dichotomy of trial, no hearing event.
Consequently, there is no need for oral argument, cross-examination, or discovery. If
such instruments happen to be used, it is at the discretion of the judge; there is no
inherent right of cross-examination or discovery; parties can present their evidence orally,
but this is not the norm. I'm trying to depict here the flexibility of the inquisitorial system
in the sense of the nonexistence of this gamut of interdependent procedures that attend
the adversary system. Therefore, when utilized in arbitral proceedings, the former, in my
evaluation, is more satisfying to the value of flexibility than the former.

5. Confidentiality

In addition to its previously stated disadvantages, discovery of documents, I believe, is an
adversarial tool by which much of the confidentiality of arbitration goes into the air. By
the parties requesting each other to present every document that comes to their mind,
their keenly maintained commercial secrets are divulged. Whereas the inquisitorial
system is absent this technique, or at least its unbridled version, it is thus more saving to
the privacy of the parties and their business dealings.
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C. An Argument

In the final analysis, my important question, and it is a difficult one, poses itself; which of
the two procedural systems is closer to arbitration? As for the adversarial system, it is the
one that endows parties with autonomy and control, significant features of arbitration.
However, it is inefficient, complex, biased, untruthful, and unveiling to commercial
secrets. On the other extreme, the inquisitorial system is better in all these respects save
for the principle of party autonomy. Obviously, the answer of my question is not in the
absolute. It is not totally siding by either the adversarial or the inquisitorial models. There
is no entirely arbitral one of them. Each one paradoxically contains arbitral and nonarbitral elements. The answer, rather, tells of which one is closer to arbitration than the
other. And here lies the difficulty of this question.

To answer this question, I believe, we have to determine whether there is a hierarchy
among the principles of international arbitration, i.e., whether some principles take
prevalence over others. By so doing, the procedural system which is closer to arbitration
is the one that embraces the most prominent principles of international arbitration.
In my view, the notion of rights is not firmly entrenched in the modus operandi of
arbitration. Arbitration comes at the expense of many rights of the parties. By opting for
arbitration, they surrender their right to resort to a natural judge within a natural court of
law. They are not even guaranteed their fundamental rights in the arbitration proceedings
themselves. 259 Arbitration rules requiring arbitrators to grant the parties a fair opportunity
of presenting their sides260 do not substitute for applying a full-blown set of procedural
259
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rights and guarantees. Twenty years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit denied parties to arbitration constitutional safeguards in the proceedings
holding that "[t]he present day penchant for arbitration may obscure for many parties who
do not have the benefit of hindsight that the arbitration system is an inferior system of
justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and
rules of law . . ."261 Although the appellate court's view does not unconditionally apply to
modern day arbitration, it captures its essence. Arbitration, in fact, sacrifices rights for the
sake of efficiency, expeditiousness, and flexibility. This is the raison d'etre of arbitration
and its main disparity with ordinary court litigation. That is why people, when having a
dispute, resort to arbitration.
Having said that, yes there is a hierarchy among the principles of international
arbitration, in which the autonomy rights of the parties come second to the efficiency and
flexibility of the arbitral process. It follows then that the inquisitorial system is closer to
arbitration than its adversarial counterpart. It guarantees the efficient, flexible, neutral,
and confidential determination of the arbitral dispute. It may curb the autonomy rights of
the parties, but sustaining rights is never the prime objective of such dispute resolution
system named international commercial arbitration.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion

International commercial arbitration is a system that functions in a universal context. It
does not relate to a certain culture; rather, it has one of its own that is known by a unique
set of principles and objectives. This fact should be born in mind by those who avail
themselves of this dispute resolution mechanism. They should relax their cultural
convictions when negotiating arbitral agreements. They should leave their national code
of procedure at home when heading to arbitral tribunals. They should, rather, adopt those
proceedings that are most compatible with their purpose for going to arbitration in the
first place. Otherwise, the option of national courts would not be much different.
This paper responds to the current tendency of utilizing adversarial techniques in
arbitration proceedings. It concludes that theses techniques are generally inappropriate
for international commercial arbitration. The inquisitorial system, by contrast, is more
proximate to the features of arbitration. However, this should not be taken as a culturallydriven preference of the inquisitorial system per se. It is actually an impartial
demonstration of the suitability of its very tools with international arbitration. They are
efficient, flexible, neutral, and confidential, and therefore they are more fulfilling to the
ambitions of those who prefer international arbitration over national litigation.
In corroboration with this conclusion, the ICC makes use of inquisitorial techniques
and avoids adversarial procedures. On the one hand, it empowers its court and arbitral
tribunal with such capacities to dominate the arbitral process as inquisitorial judges do.
On the other hand, it abandons these instruments which are espoused by the adversarial
system. Furthermore, as the CRCICA rules have shown to be a mixture of both systems,
they are absent many adversarial devices. There are no pretrial activities save for the
construction of the arbitral tribunal, no deeply established right to a hearing, no cross-
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examinations, and even the shape of discovery of documents is not clearly recognized.
Indeed, this is a manifestation of the inconveniency of the adversary system within the
arbitral process in general.
For those international arbitrators who see in the adversarial system more appropriate
procedures, I say you are far from accurate. In spite of the fact that the adversarial system
is hospitable to the autonomy rights of the parties, it comprises a set of techniques that go
against the grain of international arbitration. Autonomy rights are not in essence its only
and prime objective. Further, some of these techniques are direct upshots of a certain
approach with which international arbitration has no affinity. There is no jury panel in
arbitration sessions that justifies the presentation of evidence orally rather than in writing,
with the attendant lengthy arguments, examinations, and cross-examinations.
Last but not least, one international arbitrator262 told me that in countries where the
judicial system is efficient, flexible, and speedy, people tend to prefer ordinary court
litigation over arbitration. In addition to that, with the judicialization of international
arbitration and the incorporation of these inefficient, complex adversarial techniques into
the arbitral process, international arbitration, I believe, would find many a reason to
vanish.
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